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Jamie Lee*

An Un(frand)ly Game: Preventing Patent Hold-Up
by Improving Standardization

I. Introduction
In today’s consumer market, nearly all technological products contain
standardized components and implement standardized functions.1 Standardization
is required for the product’s functionality because many components need to be
combined to create a final technological product.2 Standardization also provides
numerous benefits to consumers and producers. Consumers benefit through lower
prices, increased options, and greater innovation,3 while producers benefit through
lower research and development costs, reduced time to market, greater sales, and
increased competition.4
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1. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889,
1896 (2002).
2. See Edith Ramirez, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Before the U. S. Comm. on the Judiciary Concerning Oversight of the Impact on Competition of
Exclusion Order to Enforce Standard-Essential Patents 4 (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/de
fault/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-concerning-oversight-i
mpact-competition-exclusion-orders/120711standardpatents.pdf [hereinafter FTC Oversight] (discussing the
“inoperability problem”).
3. See Suzanne Munck, Chief Counsel for Intellectual Property, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement
of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, Before the U.S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition
Policy and Consumer Rights Concerning Standard Essential Patent Disputes and Antitrust Law 4 (July 30,
2013) (“Inclusion of patented technologies in a standard can benefit consumers because it allows SSOs and their
members to choose from a broader set of available technologies. . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
4. Daniele Gerundino & Michael Hilb, The ISO Methodology: Assessing the Economic Benefits of Standards,
ISO FOCUS+, June 2010, at 10, 12, 14, available at http://www.iso.org/sites/TC_Chairs_2011/assets/Gerudino_H
ilb_ISO%20Focus%2010-06-E.pdf.
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Nevertheless, these proposed benefits can often be delayed or even unrealized
due to the patent hold-up game. The “game” begins when technology firms have
the good fortune of having their patented technologies selected as part of an
industry standard.5 The selected patents are designated as “essential” to the standard
and the patent owners become “standard-essential patent” (“SEP”) holders.6 Once
the standard is implemented, SEP holders “use the leverage that they may acquire as
a result of the standard setting process to negotiate higher royalty rates or other
favorable terms after the standard is adopted than they could have credibly
demanded beforehand”7 or “hold-up” their SEP by threatening patent infringement
litigation.8 By threatening costly litigation, SEP holders deter companies from
pursuing innovation.9 In the end, consumers are the ultimate losers because they
are forced to pay higher prices due to a decrease in product selection and lack of
innovation that results from patent hold-up.10
Notwithstanding the detrimental impact on consumers and the economy, courts
and administrative agencies have applied injunctive relief in SEP litigation
inconsistently, thereby failing to deter SEPs from engaging in self-serving patent
hold-up actions.11 The U.S. Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, and International
Trade Commission (“ITC”) have also failed to provide guidance on this issue.12 In
addition, administrative agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”),
have failed to deter patent hold-up despite their significant role in funding research
and development in the private industry.13
Since the courts and administrative agencies have failed to properly define and
limit the scope of injunctive relief in SEP litigation, Congress should provide direct
guidance on this issue, but has failed to do so. The Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act is the only legislation that even tangentially addresses the issue of patent hold5. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Owings & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining Injunctions: The Case Against
Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek Injunctions, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2014, at
1, 1.
6. See Munck, supra note 3, at 4.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted).
9. See James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 401, 429
(2013).
10. See Stewart Mitchell, Microsoft and Apple Patents “Push Up Price of Android”, PC PRO (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/369100/microsoft-and-apple-patents-push-up-price-of-android (stating that
Google’s patent war with Apple and Microsoft could lead to price increases for Google’s Android phones and
less handset choice).
11. See infra Part III.C.3.
12. See infra Parts III, IV.
13. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 30 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter
FTC Innovation] (“In FY 2003, federal investment in R&D hit a new record of $117 billion, a 13.8 percent
increase over FY 2002 and the largest dollar increase in history.” (internal citations omitted)).
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up, but it only limits the ability of SEP holders to join unrelated parties to a patent
suit.14 As such, this legislation does not clarify or limit the scope of injunctive relief
for potential abuse by SEPs.15
Given that the courts, administrative agencies, and Congress have failed to deter
SEPs from engaging in self-serving patent hold-up, this Comment proposes ways to
prevent it. Part II discusses the patent system, standardization, and how they
contribute to the patent hold-up game. Part III identifies issues embedded within
standardization and discusses how these problems permit SEP holders to
continually engage in patent hold-up. Finally, Part IV proposes ways to deter patent
hold-up by discussing changes to standardization, which will allow producers and
consumers to finally realize the benefits of standardization.

II. The Patent System and Standardization
The goal of the patent system is to encourage firms to innovate against any fears of
risk or high cost.16 Patents give their owners the right to prevent others from
making, using, or selling any patented products within the United States during the
term of the patent.17 This exclusive right allows innovators to recoup their
investment in research and development (“R&D”) because prices for their product
will not be lowered due to competition from “copycats” in the market throughout
the duration of their patent.18
A. Standard-Setting Organizations
Due to the complexity of its products, the technology industry requires
standardization.19 This is mainly due to the fact that popular products, including

14.

See 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2011).
Charles Gorenstein, America Invents Act Exercises “Con-Troll” Over Patent Litigation, IP WATCHDOG
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/09/19/controll-over-patent-litigation/id=19279 (describing
the Act’s joinder restrictions, but noting that it is so far unclear how the courts will interpret this provision).
16. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH
COMPETITION 1 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC
EVOLVING].
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
18. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 1 (“By preventing copying that might otherwise drive down prices,
the patent system allows innovators to recoup their investment in research and development (R&D).”).
19. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, POLICY STATEMENT ON REMEDIES
FOR STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS SUBJECT TO VOLUNTARY F/RAND COMMITMENTS 3 (2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/290994.pdf (“Interoperability standards have paved the way for
moving many important innovations into the marketplace, including the complex communications networks
and sophisticated mobile computing devices that are hallmarks of the modern age.”); see also Mark A. Lemley &
Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2009–10 (2007) (arguing that patent
hold-up is most prevalent in multi-component technological products because you cannot separate the
infringing component from non-infringing ones after production).
15.
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smart phones, laptop and tablet computers, and gaming consoles, all depend on
hundreds of different inventions working together in a single system.20 These
technologies may also create an “interoperability” problem because there are too
many inventions that must work together to create one product.21
To address the interoperability issue, various industries have established
standard-setting organizations (“SSO”) to determine the standards that firms will
follow to create their products.22 These SSOs typically consists of a combination of
universities, private companies, vendors, and government agencies.23 For example,
the Telecommunications Industry Association is an association of providers of
communications and information technology products and services that prepares
standards for performance testing and compatibility.24 The XMPP Standards
Foundation is an independent, nonprofit standards development organization
whose experts define open protocols for presence, instant messaging, and real-time
communication.25
While it seems anticompetitive to allow interested industry members and
competitors to develop new technology together,26 patent and antitrust laws are
“complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry, and
competition.”27 The Patent Clause “reflects a balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition” by limiting
the duration of the patent.28 Competition stimulates innovation by incentivizing
firms to design new or better products and processes under the protection of patent
rights.29 Therefore, the economic benefits gained from standardization are generally
seen to outweigh the risks of collusion and price-fixing violations, so long as

20.

FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 4.
Id.
22. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889,
1896 (2002) (defining a standard as “any set of technological specifications that either provides or is intended to
provide a common design for a product or process”).
23. See Sector Members, Associates, and Academia, INT’L TELECOMMS. UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/mem
bership/Pages/sector-members.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2015).
24. About, TIA ADVANCED GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, http://www.tiaonline.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2015).
25. About, XMPP STANDARDS FOUNDATION, http://xmpp.org/about-xmpp/xsf/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2015).
26. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (“Any combination which
tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity.”).
27. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal citations
omitted); see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (discussing how federal
patent laws embody “a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that
imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a
competitive economy”).
28. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
29. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 2.
21.
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discussions regarding new standards are approached from a purely technical point
of view.30
B. Standardization
During standardization, companies who voluntarily belong to SSOs are typically
required to disclose patents or patent applications that would potentially be used in
the industry standard.31 In other words, members only need to disclose their patents
when there is some reasonable expectation that a license is needed to implement the
standard.32 While SEPs are being identified by the SSO for the industry standard,
companies must consent to enter license negotiations with anyone who wishes to
implement the standard.33 Approximately 63% of organizations require the use of
fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms (“FRAND” or “RAND”) in their
licenses.34 Non-discriminatory means that “a patentee who makes or sells compliant
products cannot charge a higher royalty to an implementer against whom the
patentee competes directly than to another party who sells very distinct compliant
products.”35
SSOs will then create standards to ensure that companies will communicate with
each other and standardize the use of critical technologies.36 If a company’s patent is
implemented in the standard, the firm is known as a SEP.37 Once a standard is

30. BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD, DENNIS P. O’REILLEY & D. BRIAN KACEDON, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE
AGREEMENTS § 29.01.G, at 422 (6th ed. 2008) (internal citation omitted).
31. Id. at 423 (discussing Rambus’ duty to disclose its patents during standardization) (internal citation
omitted); see Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[U]nder such an
amorphous duty [to disclose], any patent or application having a vague relationship to the standard would have
to be disclosed. [SSO] members would be required to disclose improvement patents, implementation patents,
and patents directed to the testing of standard-compliant devices–even though the standard itself could be
practiced without licenses under such patents.”).
32. Rambus, 318 F.3d at 1100–01 (“Rambus’s duty to disclose extended only to claims in patents or
applications that reasonably might be necessary to practice the standard.”).
33. See Michele K. Herman, Negotiating Standards-Related Patent Licenses: How the Deal Is Done, A.B.A.
SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 25 ANNUAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW CONFERENCE (Apr. 7–10,
2010).
34. Benjamin Chiao, Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical
Analysis, 19 n.20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11156, 2006), available at http://ww
w.nber.org/papers/w11156.pdf (“The majority (63%) of organizations use RAND in the patent licensing rules.
Only 9% of organizations use royalty-free rules. Even fewer organizations use assignment (2%) and compulsory
rules (2%).”).
35. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for StandardEssential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1149 n.42 (2013) [hereinafter Lemley 2013].
36. See FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 2.
37. See Standardized Technology and Standard-Essential Patents, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov
/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc-competiti
on-concerns-markets-devices-smart/130103google-seps.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
TH
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established, SEP holders are expected to uphold their prior RAND commitments
and enter into negotiations with any firm that is seeking a license based on the
standard.38 Yet as Judge Posner previously noted, “once a patent becomes essential
to a standard, the patentee’s bargaining power surges because a prospective licensee
has no alternative to licensing the patent; he is at the patentee’s mercy.”39 This is the
beginning of the patent hold-up game.40
C. The Patent Hold-Up Game
Theoretically, there are many economic benefits in standardizing technology,41 but
the patent hold-up game diminishes any such benefit (except for the SEP holder).
When an SSO incorporates a patented technology into the adopted standard,
industry participants will make investments according to this new standard.42 In
reliance of this standard, participants will often make sunk-cost investments43
without realizing that the technology may implicate another participant’s patent.44
It is then no longer feasible for firms to deviate from the standard because they
“face substantial switching costs in abandoning initial designs and substituting a
different technology.”45 As a result, a SEP holder disregards its initial commitment
to license its patent on RAND terms46 and instead, “holds up” its patent to negotiate
higher royalty rates and other favorable terms than would have been possible prior
to the standard adoption, or threaten costly litigation and an injunction.47

III. Standardization Issues that Permit Patent Hold-Up
There are a number of issues in standardization that allow SEP holders to
continually engage in patent hold-up. First, companies may fail to provide proper
notice of their patent interests in an attempt to obtain future profit.48 Second,
38.

See Herman, supra note 33, at 2.
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 901, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
40. See infra Part II.C. The patent hold-up game may also be referred to as “patent hold-up.”
41. See FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 4 (“[S]tandards can create enormous value for consumers by
increasing competition, innovation, product quality, and choice.”).
42. Id. at 5.
43. See Unsinkable Sunk Cost, LIVING ECON., http://livingeconomics.org/article.asp?docId=37 (last visited
Jan. 31, 2013) (defining “sunk cost” as a “[c]ost that cannot be recovered or diverted towards alternative uses”).
44. Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1179
(2009) (“The elements of patent hold up . . . are present [when] the patent reads on a component of a
multicomponent end product, the owner is a nonmanufacturing patentee, and the prospect of obtaining
injunctive relief ex post facilitates the extraction of substantially higher royalties than would be attributable to
the value of the patented feature alone.”).
45. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 5.
46. Ginsburg, Owings & Wright, supra note 5, at 1.
47. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 5.
48. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n).
39.
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companies are expected to license their patents on “reasonable” terms but
reasonableness has not been clearly defined, which has resulted in significant
litigation.49 Third, even if a company is found to have engaged in patent hold-up,
the available patent remedies are inappropriate for patent hold-up because they
may not apply or do not adequately compensate aggrieved companies.50
A. Notice Issues
During standardization, notice may fail to adequately inform the participants’
expectations on the boundaries of their products. Notice is defined as “how well a
patent informs the public [a person skilled in the relevant art] of what technology is
protected.”51 Clear notice is important because it increases innovation by
encouraging collaboration, technology transfer, and design-around.52 Clearlydefined patent rights also help companies easily identify and license technology they
wish to develop or adopt.53 On the other hand, poor patent notice can undermine
innovation because “potential collaborators or licensees may not find relevant
patents, or they may hesitate to invest in technology when the scope of patent
protection is unclear.”54
During standardization, patents are included on some reasonable expectation
that a license is needed to implement the standard.55 Since there is some amount of
speculation, a producer may unknowingly infringe on a patent that ends up being
selected for the industry standard. In patent hold-up, SEP holders will rely on this
unknowing infringement to threaten patent litigation and demand higher
royalties.56
B. The Definition of “Reasonable” RAND Terms is Unclear
SSOs attempt to prevent patent hold-up by requiring participants to license their
patents on RAND terms.57 Although RAND commitments attempt to solve the
patent hold-up problem by requiring SEP holders to reveal their licensing terms,
the SSOs’ failure to clearly define “reasonableness” has resulted in inconsistent

49.

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.3.
51. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 2.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081 (2003) (stating that members only need to
disclose patents when there is a reasonable expectation that a license is needed to implement the standard).
56. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 3 (“When firms choose technologies and market products despite an
uncertain patent landscape, they risk post-launch patent assertions and litigation.”).
57. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 6 (internal citation omitted).
50.
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application of commitment terms.58 Finding a consistent definition of what
constitutes a RAND term is difficult because there is no set formula.59 In addition, a
company’s commitment to an SSO is not an actual license in and of itself; instead, it
is a willingness to offer a license on RAND terms when the opportunity arises.60
Therefore, this lack of clarity has caused a significant amount of litigation for firms
entangled within the patent hold-up game.61
1. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.
In Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., Qualcomm, a wireless telecommunications
products company, acquired monopoly power in the telecommunications industry
after convincing an SSO to adopt a standard that incorporated its patents.62 In
response, Broadcom, a chipset manufacturer, alleged that Qualcomm violated
antitrust laws by charging more than a RAND fee to the licensees.63 The Third
Circuit held that “a patent holder’s intentionally false promise to license essential
proprietary technology on [RAND] terms . . . is actionable anticompetitive
conduct.”64
The case illustrates the court’s failure to adequately define RAND terms, which
permits SEP holders to continually engage in patent hold-up and makes the future
of standardization uncertain. On one hand, the Third Circuit’s rule that a SEP
holder must have committed an “intentional” false promise encourages patent
hold-up since companies can escape scrutiny by simply claiming that they are
reneging on their earlier commitment. On the other hand, the future of
standardization is in jeopardy because high-cost antitrust remedies will deter
companies from participating in standardization.65
58. See Jorge L. Contreras, An Empirical Study of the Effects of Ex Ante Licensing Disclosure Policies on the
Development of Voluntary Technical Standards, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. STANDARDS SERVS. GRP.,
GCR 11-934, at 3–4 (June 27, 2011) (discussing “FRAND Licensing Requirements” cases).
59. Id. at 1; see also Herman, supra note 33, at 5 (“Some critics argue that RAND is too indefinite and, as a
result, an implementer may only learn after it is locked into a standard that a patentee’s view of ‘reasonable’ is
very different from its own. . . . Some similarly argue that the cumulative RAND royalties for patented
technology incorporated into a standard may turn out to be excessive because there are no specific limitations
placed on the RAND commitment and no way to gauge in advance of adoption the cumulative amount of
royalties to be charged.”).
60. Herman, supra note 33, at 2.
61. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012); Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007); Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061
(W.D. Wis. 2012); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 888 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Microsoft
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
62. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d at 304.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 314.
65. Kenneth Ewing, Private Anti-Trust Remedies Under US Law, 1 PLC CROSS-BORDER: COMPETITION
HANDBOOK 87, 87 (2007), available at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2804.pdf (“[S]pecial rules,
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2. Rambus Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
The FTC claimed that Rambus, Inc., a technology development firm, deceptively
failed to disclose the patent interests it held in four technologies that were used to
standardize a faster architecture for dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”) to
the SSO.66 The SSO adopted an industry standard that caused the SEP holder to gain
a 90 percent market monopoly over licensing of DRAM technology.67 As a result,
the FTC found that Rambus breached SSO policies and violated Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolistic conduct.68 On appeal, the court held
that there was an insufficient basis for liability. The court noted that even if
Rambus’ nondisclosure contravened the SSO’s policies, it only prevented the SSO
from extracting a RAND commitment from Rambus when standardizing its
technology, which does not constitute an antitrust violation.69 Rambus reiterates the
importance of incorporating standards that clarify the standardization process.70
C. Patent Law Remedies are Inappropriate for Patent Hold-up
While patent law remedies are crucial to promote innovation and
commercialization of new products,71 these remedies also encourage patent holdup. Successful remedies will “compensate for past infringement, prohibit future
infringement, and deter infringement in the first instance.”72 However, poor notice
and lack of clarity when it comes to disclosure and reasonableness suggest that the
full range of available patent law remedies may be inappropriate for patent hold-up
litigation.73

such as the automatic trebling of damages, award of attorneys’ fees and costs, and aggregation of hundreds to
thousands or more claims within a single action on behalf of a class of similarly placed claimants, dramatically
increase both the attractiveness of bringing private claims and the stakes for defendants.”).
66. Rambus Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
67. Id. at 459.
68. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof. . . .”).
69. Rambus, 522 F.3d at 462.
70. Id. at 469 (“[A]lthough antitrust can serve as a useful check on abuses of the standard-setting process, it
cannot substitute for a general enforcement regime for disclosure rules.” (citing 2 IP & ANTITRUST § 35.5 at 35–
51)).
71. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 140.
72. Id. at 141. Three types of redress accomplish these tasks: compensatory damages, enhanced damages,
and injunctive relief.
73. See Jorge L. Contreras, So That’s What “RAND” Means?: A Brief Report on the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in Microsoft v. Motorola, PATENTLYO (Apr. 27, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/04
/so-thats-what-rand-means-a-brief-report-on-the-findings-of-fact-and-conclusions-of-law-in-microsoft-v-mot
orola.html (“Thus, unlike most patent licensing negotiations, the licensing of standards-essential patents takes
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1. Compensatory Damages
Compensatory damages seek to make a patent holder “whole again” in spite of the
infringement.74 This is accomplished by reflecting the economic realities of the
market and rendering the “patentee no worse off, but also no better off, than it
would have been absent the infringement.”75 Two measures are used to calculate
compensatory damages: lost profits and reasonable royalties.76 “Lost profits”
assumes that a patent holder is selling a product in the marketplace and seeks its
entitled return.77 When the patent holder does not actually sell the product,
compensatory damages are calculated “based on a hypothetical negotiation between
a willing licensor (the patentee) and a willing licensee (the infringer), otherwise
known as the ‘reasonable royalty’ analysis.”78 This calculation is based on hypothesis
because the SEP is not a final product, but rather, a component of the final
product,79 but is also supported by common law.80 Since it is difficult to conclusively
determine what is reasonable, aggrieved companies will never become “whole
again.” Therefore, compensatory damages are an inadequate remedy for patent
hold-up.
2. Enhanced Damages
Enhanced damages are awarded when there has been “willful infringement.”81 The
concept of “willfulness” generally applies to circumstances where the technology
on a public character. It is not merely a closed-door negotiation between two private parties. It must be
conducted, and reviewed, with these public benefits in mind.”).
74. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 141 (following a finding of infringement, a court shall award damages
“adequate to compensate for the infringement” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284)); see also Riles v. Shell Exploration &
Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Compensatory damages, by definition, make the patentee
whole, as opposed to punishing the infringer.”).
75. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 142 (internal citations omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 143.
78. Id.
79. See supra Part I.
80. Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., Inc., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The statute contemplates
that when a patentee is unable to prove entitlement to lost profits or an established royalty rate, it is entitled to
‘reasonable royalty’ damages based upon a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee and the infringer
when the infringement began.”).
81. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed Cir. 2007) (establishing that willful infringement
requires clear and convincing evidence that “the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent” and that “this objectively-defined risk . . . was either known
or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer”); see also Roderick R. McKelvie et al.,
Nine Unanswered Questions After In re Seagate Technology LLC, 20 INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (“[The Federal
Circuit held] ‘that proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least a showing of
objective recklessness.’ This meant, the court explained, that a person acts ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high
risk of harm that is either known or so obvious it should be known.’ This new standard requires a party
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has been in existence for years before the patent owner sends a letter to the
developer alleging infringement.82 Suddenly, a company that believed it had
independently developed the technology becomes a willful infringer and is now
potentially liable for damages.83 This is another way that a SEP holder can “hold-up”
an independent developer.84 Furthermore, this is a unique remedy because it seeks
to punish the infringer, so the court will intentionally award the patentee more than
the market would have.85
Enhanced damages are nevertheless inappropriate for patent hold-up. Since
participating firms already know that there will be some reliance on each other’s
patents during standardization, companies cannot claim independent development
as is required by enhanced damages. In addition, poor patent notice during
standardization creates a level of uncertainty86 that would make it difficult to prove
that an “infringer” knowingly violated a patent. Therefore, enhanced damages are
an inadequate remedy for patent hold-up.
3. Permanent Injunctions
Permanent injunctions play a critical role in protecting exclusivity and maintaining
the control that allows a patent holder to reap the market reward following a
finding of infringement.87 There is a debate, however, over whether injunctive relief
should be available to parties under RAND commitments.88 A prospective licensee
would have already spent much of their R&D to comply with the new industry
standard, as well as relied on the RAND terms.89 The licensee would then face
significant cost in defending against patent hold-up litigation and would be
deterred from pursuing more innovation.90 Therefore, although permanent
injunctions provide important protections for a patent holder, they should not be
allowed in patent hold-up because they would potentially reward self-serving SEP

claiming willfulness to ‘show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively
high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.’”).
82. Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV.
149, 164 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 141.
86. See supra Part III.A.
87. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 143.
88. See Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Fed. Trade Comm’n to Commenters (July 23, 2013) (on file
with Fed. Trade Comm’n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724
googlemotorolaletter.pdf.
89. See supra Part II.C.
90. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 9, at 429.
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holders who pursue injunctive relief solely to demand higher royalties for their
patents.91
The Patent Act requires that following a finding of infringement, the court
should consider “principles of equity” in deciding whether to grant a permanent
injunction against an infringer.92 Prior to 2006, permanent injunctions were
virtually automatic after a district court found infringement on a presumption of
irreparable harm.93 In 2006, however, the Court in eBay v. MercExchange, rejected
the presumption of irreparable harm in favor of applying “traditional equitable
principles.”94 These “traditional equitable principles” require that a plaintiff must
demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.95
Although eBay’s traditional equitable approach seems clear on its face, Chief
Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion in eBay suggests that applying equitable
principles permits courts to exercise considerable discretion, which has resulted in
inconsistent rulings on injunctive relief.96 Chief Justice Roberts observed that courts
historically granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement and suggested
that the district courts should use this as a rule of thumb.97 On the other hand,
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence alluded that this general rule may be inappropriate
in some cases, including those involving patent hold-up.98 He observed that SEP
holders represent a new breed of patentees who “use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees,”99
and cautioned that SEP holders employ injunctive relief “as a bargaining tool to
charge exorbitant fees.”100 In such cases, “legal damages may well be sufficient to

91.

See supra Part II.C.
35 U.S.C. § 283 (2012).
93. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 7 (internal citation omitted).
94. 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
95. Id. at 391 (internal citation omitted).
96. See id at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
97. Id. at 395.
98. Id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in
many instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present
considerations quite unlike earlier cases.”).
99. Id. at 396.
100. Id.
92.
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compensate [SEP holders] for the infringement[,] and [that] an injunction may not
serve the public interest.”101
The courts are unclear on when SEP holders are entitled to injunctive relief.102
After the Supreme Court remanded the case, the district court in eBay denied
injunctive relief to MercExchange.103 The court stated, “MercExchange’s consistent
practice of licensing, rather than developing, its patents . . . is one factor that [the]
court must consider in weighing the equities.”104 Therefore, despite the Supreme
Court’s stated caution against inflexible rules, courts maintain that SEP holder
status influences whether they will receive injunctive relief.105
In fact, some courts have granted injunctive relief to SEP holders. For example,
in Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation v. Buffalo Technology
Inc., a Texas federal court found that the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief
because it lost irrevocable research opportunities and suffered reputational damage,
even though it did not license its inventions in the marketplace.106 As a result, courts
have inconsistently applied eBay’s traditional equitable principles by either granting
permanent injunctions, regardless of the patent holder’s status, or denying them
entirely for SEP holders who use them as a means of acquiring more licensing
fees.107

IV. Proposed Changes to Standardization
Since patent hold-up threatens corporate innovation and harms consumers, the
following discussion proposes changes to standardization that could deter patent
hold-up since courts, Congress, and administrative agencies have failed to
adequately address this issue.108
A. Changes to Standardization
Despite the SSO’s attempt to facilitate cooperation among technologies, its failure
to define key concepts, such as “reasonableness” and its inability to enforce

101.

Id. at 396–97.
See, e.g., id. at 394 (holding that the District Court erred in denying injunctive relief and the Court of
Appeals erred in granting injunctive relief); Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the eBay factors when denying a
permanent injunction).
103. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).
104. Id. at 570.
105. See id. at 587–88.
106. 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
107. See, e.g., Andrei Iancu & W. Joss Nichols, Balancing the Four Factors in Permanent Injunction Decisions:
A Review of Post-eBay Case Law, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 395, 404 (2007) (noting that most courts
since the eBay decision continued to grant permanent injunctions, but denied such relief for patent trolls).
108. See supra Parts I, III.
102.
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previous RAND commitments by SEP holders has resulted in significant
litigation.109 Therefore, specific changes to standardization may prevent SEP holders
from engaging in patent hold-up.
1. Define “Reasonable” Royalty During Standardization
“Reasonable royalty” is essential to a SEP holder’s RAND commitment, but the SSO
has failed to provide guidance on this key concept during standardization.110
Reasonable royalties are based on a “hypothetical negotiation between a willing
licensor (the patentee) and a willing licensee (the infringer).”111 Therefore, the
hypothetical negotiation needs to take place during the standardization process and
under conditions where the alternative technological components are identified.
Under this approach, all firms are well-informed about the best potential noninfringing alternatives to the proposed standard and will be able to make an
informed decision.112 This approach is ideal because it would allow SSOs to take
each patent holder’s licensing terms and royalty rates into account when deciding
what technological improvements to use, which would impede a SEP holder’s
ability to leverage any new bargaining power resulting from being incorporated into
an SSO standard.113
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.’s 15-factor test to determine
reasonable royalty during standardization114 is not instructive because the numerous
factors may create opportunities for a SEP holder to distort their conduct. For
example, if a SEP holder can satisfy the cost-benefit analysis factor by proving that
protecting their technology is more desirable,115 then a SEP holder may achieve the
higher royalty that it sought as part of patent hold-up.
The SSO should select only a few of Georgia-Pacific’s 15 factors as a guide to
determine whether the participating firm’s RAND terms are reasonable before
finalizing the industry standard. Some of the factors that would be worth
considering include: (1) the utility and advantages of the patent property over the
109.

See supra Part III.B.
Lemley 2013, supra note 35, at 1146.
111. FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 143.
112. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The Federal Circuit held that the determinative question is: “had the Infringer not infringed, what would the
Patent Holder–Licensee have made?” Id. In responding to this question, the court required sound economic
proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes with infringement factored out of the economic picture.
Id. A fair and accurate reconstruction of the “but for” market also must take into account, where relevant,
alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have undertaken had he not infringed. Id.
113. Id. at 1351.
114. 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (providing a comprehensive list of evidentiary facts that are
relevant to determine the amount of a reasonable royalty).
115. Id. (“The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had
been used for working out similar results.”).
110.
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old modes or devices, (2) the amount which a prudent licensee would have been
willing to pay as a royalty, as well as the amount that would have been acceptable by
a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license, and (3) the testimony of
qualified experts. These factors will not only provide the SSO with a value estimate
of the patent before standardization, but they will also provide the SSO with greater
support in enforcing a SEP holder’s RAND commitment because SSOs can now
point to specific guidelines that justify the pre-determined royalty rate. A smaller
number of factors would also encourage a SEP holder to comply with their previous
RAND commitments because they would no longer be able to rely on other factors
to hide engaging in patent hold-up.
2. Enforce Previous “RAND” Commitments by Deeming it an Enforceable Agreement
Since a RAND commitment is nothing more than a promise from a SEP holder to
license its patent to another competitor,116 the SSO should deem RAND
commitments as an enforceable agreement. For example, including explicit thirdparty beneficiary clauses that grant all prospective licensees the right to enforce the
RAND commitment would discourage SEP holders from rescinding their original
promise because SEP holders would now be liable to many licensees—not just the
specific party that is named.117 In addition, a SEP holder would also be bound by the
doctrine of promissory estoppel and would most likely not want to risk
involvement in costly litigation.118
3. Include a Binding Arbitration Provision
Once a SEP holder’s prior RAND commitment becomes an enforceable agreement,
the SSO can include an arbitration provision that would prevent SEP holders from
flooding the courts with frivolous infringement lawsuits due to their self-serving
patent hold-up.119 When enforcing an arbitration agreement, the courts and
arbitrators must “give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the
parties.”120 Arbitration is considered to be a legitimate judicial venue to resolve

116.

See Ginsburg, Owings & Wright, supra note 5, at 1.
General Contract Clauses: Third-party Beneficiaries, PRACTICAL LAW, http://us.practicallaw.com/6-519-7
630 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
118. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing how Microsoft alleged
that Motorola improperly refused to offer it licenses for patents essential to industrial standards on reasonable
and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms, asserting claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and
declaratory relief).
119. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (“By agreeing
to arbitrate . . . , [a party] trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity,
informality, and expedition of arbitration.”).
120. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).
117.
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costly patent disputes.121 In fact, the FTC has used judicially-facilitated negotiation
in settling its own patent hold-up suits.122
In addition, arbitration minimizes the courts’ inconsistent rulings on patent
hold-up cases.123 Arbitrators are typically “those who are prominent and
experienced members of the specific business community in which the dispute to be
arbitrated arose.”124 Therefore, the arbitrator would be a neutral and knowledgeable
third party who thoroughly understands standardization procedures and would
decide the infringement allegations fairly to both parties involved.125 Therefore,
instituting an arbitration provision is a simple fix that will not only effectively
decrease a SEP holder’s ability to engage in patent hold-up, but also create little
disruption to the standardization process once RAND terms become an enforceable
agreement.
B. Prevent Access to the International Trade Commission
Eliminating the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) as a potential judicial
resource is important for patent hold-up because ITC orders can prohibit
standardized technological products from being sold to consumers domestically
and internationally. The ITC is a quasi-judicial, independent federal agency
established by Congress to investigate a wide-range of trade matters, which may
include products that are developed by SEP holders.126 After finding patent
infringement, under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the ITC will issue either a
cease and desist order, which prohibits a defendant from selling infringing articles
out of U.S. inventory,127 or an exclusion order, which directs the U.S. Customs
Service to bar infringing articles from entering the U.S.128

121. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (declaring a national policy in favor of
arbitration); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1755–56 (2011) (enforcing a clause
banning class actions in favor of arbitration).
122. See, e.g., Motorola Mobility LLC, Docket No. C-4410, at *10 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013) (decision and
order), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolado.pd
f. The final Decision and Order included the following provision: “Respondents shall file for arbitration and
deliver to the Qualified Recipient(s) of the Potential Licensee a proposed License Agreement for the
Respondents’ FRAND Patents Essential to the Covered Standards, and, if either party is seeking Reciprocity, to
the Potential Licensee’s FRAND Patents essential to the Covered Standards, in each case to the extent not
already licensed.” Id.
123. See supra Part III.C.3.
124. Int’l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
125. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960) (noting
that an arbitrator is “a system of self-government created by and confined to the parties” and he has no “general
charter to administer justice for a community which transcends the parties.” (internal citation omitted)).
126. FTC Oversight, supra note 2, at 9.
127. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).
128. Id. § 1337(f).
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Although all federal courts must follow the eBay’s equitable standard when
deciding whether to grant an injunction, the ITC is not required to follow such a
standard.129 This discrepancy has significantly increased litigation because SEP
holders have turned to this court to grant injunctions despite violating their RAND
terms.130 Therefore, drafting an arbitration provision that limits patent infringement
proceedings to U.S. courts during standardization will prevent SEP holders from
retreating to the ITC for more favorable treatment.

IV. Conclusion
Patent hold-up is not only a significant legal bottleneck,131 but also presents a losing
situation for both the producer and the consumer. If a producer develops a product
that is unknowingly covered by a patent, the producer faces expensive and timeconsuming litigation.132 At the same time, if the infringer chooses to negotiate
royalties with a SEP holder, the cost for product development skyrockets as the
infringer would now need to account for higher royalties than anticipated to pursue
its product innovation.133 The consumer loses financially, as it has to pay for higher
prices for this patent infringement litigation and personally, as the number of
product options decreases.134 Therefore, it is important for courts, administrative
agencies, and Congress to provide more guidance on the limits of injunctive relief
in patent hold-up and make the changes to standardization, which would prevent
SEP holders from continually interfering with innovation for their own financial
benefit.

129. See Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Given the different
statutory underpinnings for relief before the Commission in Section 337 actions and before the district courts in
suits for patent infringement, this court holds that eBay does not apply to Commission remedy determinations
under Section 337.”).
130. Use of the ITC as a venue for patent challenges has tripled in the last ten years. Colleen V. Chien,
Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 63, 68 (2008). Sixty-five percent of those cases proceed simultaneously in federal district court. Id.
at 64. See also FTC EVOLVING, supra note 16, at 239–40 (“Expanded use of the ITC and the parallel proceedings
in district courts have led some commentators to raise concerns about inconsistent results in individual cases
and incoherent development of patent policy.” (internal citation omitted)).
131. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of
High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1594 (2009) (noting that the federal district courts handled 2,300
patent infringement suits between 2000–2008; mostly in the technology sector).
132. FTC Innovation, supra note 13, at 6.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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